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Presentence Reports: An Analysis of Uses,
Limitations and Civil Liberties Issues
Daniel Katkin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Individualization in punishment has emerged as a guiding
consideration of modern criminal science.' The sentencing de-
cision is no longer legislative in nature; the statute books no
longer dictate the precise limits of the punishment on the basis
of the nature of the crime. The judiciary has been vested with
broad discretion and sentencing has become the most difficult
and usually the only function of the criminal bench.2  Presen-
tence reports are essential to the proper use of this discretion.
The concept of individualization revolves around a notion
that justice will best be served when the rehabilitation of the
convicted offender into a noncriminal member of society is
among the objectives of the sentencing decision. Other objec-
tives include isolation of the offender from society to prevent
criminal conduct during the period of confinement, deterrence
of the offender after release (primary deterrence), deterrence of
others who have tendencies toward similar criminal conduct
(secondary deterrence), reaffirmation of societal norms for the
purpose of maintaining respect for the norms themselves and
retribution, that is satisfaction of the community's emotional
desire to punish the offender.3
II. NATURE AND USE OF THE
PRESENTENCE REPORT
A. STATUTORY BASis
The sentencing authority is unable to determine the priority
* Assistant Professor of Social Welfare, State University of New
York at Buffalo.
1. F. FRANKaFunR & J. LANms, THE BusnisSS OF THE SuPREMV
COURT 249 (1927).
2. Note, Due Process and Legislative Standards in Sentencing, 101
U. PA. L. REv. 257 (1952). In 1950, out of a total of 33,502 convictions in
federal courts, 31,739 pleaded guilty or nolo contendere. In 1962, out
of a total of 34,638 cases disposed of by federal courts, 85.8 percent re-
sulted in convictions and 85.7 percent of those convicted pleaded guilty.
1962 Din. Ai. OFF. U.S. CTS. AwN. REP. 110. From July 1, 1961, to
June 30, 1962, 70.8 percent of all persons convicted or handled as
youthful offenders in the New York courts were sentenced after a
guilty plea. 1963 N.Y. Jui. CoNF. AN. REP. 152-54.
3. Note Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A
Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453, 1455 (1960).
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and relationship of these objectives in each particular case with-
out factual information about the offender and his environment.
The presentence investigation is designed to uncover the neces-
sary facts. Judges often seem to feel that their broad experience
has equipped them to size up their fellow men by merely looking
and talking to them; but the knowledge of the life of a man, his
background and family, is the only proper basis for determina-
tion of his treatment. There is no substitute for information.
The sentencing judge has the tools with which to acquire that
information (presentence reports). "Failure to make full use
of those tools cannot be justified. '4 Such failure, however, is not
the rule.5 Statutes in most jurisdictions authorize courts to
request presentence reports from probation officers, and even
without such authorization, courts apparently have felt free to
make use of such reports.0 The relevant statutes are varied.
Many require the preparation of reports in the case of certain
classes of offenders, such as felons.7 Others prohibit a grant of
probation or a suspension of sentence absent consideration of
such a report.8  A third type gives the trial court complete
4. Schwellenbach, Information Versus Intuition in the Imposition
of Sentence, 7 FED. PROBATION 3 (Jan.-Mar. 1943).
5. Louis J. Sharp, Chief of the Probation Division, Administra-
tive Office of the Federal Courts, has pointed out that nationally 87 per-
cent of all convicted defendants were investigated by a probation offi-
cer in 1960. Sharp, The Presentence Report, 30 F.R.D. 242, 243 (1962).
6. Note, Employment of Social Investigation Reports in Criminal
and Juvenile Proceedings, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 702, 703 (1958).
7. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-16-2 (1963) (felonies where
court has discretion as to penalty); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-109 (1960)(all first offender felons except those convicted of first degree murder or
in any case in which the court desires a report with the exception of cases
of first degree murder); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 771.14 (1968) (all
felons and cases involving a misdemeanant in which the court desires a
report); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-198 (1965) (where services of a probation
officer are available). The Model Penal Code contemplates broad use
of presentence reports:
(1) The Court shall not impose sentence without first ordering
a presentence investigation of the defendant and according
due consideration to a written report of such investigation
where:(a) the defendant has been convicted of a felony; or(b) the defendant is less than twenty-two years of
age and has been convicted of a crime; or
(c) the defendant will be (placed on probation or)
sentenced to imprisonment for an extended term.(2) The Court may order a presentence investigation in any
other case.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
8. Note, supra note 6, at 703.
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discretion as to the use of these reports.9
Probation officers are generally responsible for the investi-
gation that yields the report.10 Generally the report is sub-
mitted to the judge after a plea or verdict of guilty. It is rea-
soned that earlier submission might prove inconsistent with the
judge's role as fair and impartial arbiter of the issue of guilt,"
particularly since reports do not have to comply with the trial
rules of evidence.12
B. CONTENTS OF THE REPORT
There is some disagreement over the nature of the contents
of an adequate report. It is seen on the one hand as a very
technical and precise study and on the other as a humane investi-
gation into a unique individual. The technical and precise study
approach is most clearly delineated in the proposal of the Ju-
dicial Conference of the United States,'" which suggests that a
decision to give probation (which must be based on the informa-
tion contained in a presentence report) should be made on very
narrow considerations. For example, in the case of an automo-
bile theft the relevant facts are the extent of the defendant's
participation and whether he is an habitual offender. Some com-
mentators have reduced the gravamen of an adequate report
to a check list. The Model Penal Code suggests:
The presentence investigation shall include an analysis of the
circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the de-
fendant's history of delinquency or criminality, physical and
mental condition, family situation and background, economic
status, education, occupation and personal habits and any other
matters that the probation officer deems relevant or the Court
directs to be included.14
9. E.g., FED. R. CRnm. P. 32(a) (probation officer shall report
unless judge directs otherwise).
10. Each of the statutes cited at note 7 supra makes the preparation
of such reports the duty of the probation officer. In most jurisdictions
these officers must be college graduates with a year's experience with
a recognized social work agency. Note, supra note 6, at 702.
11. United States v. Christakos, 83 F. Supp. 521, 525 (N.). Ala.
1949). The purpose of not disclosing a report to the judge until after a
finding of guilt is "to insure the fact, as well as the appearance, that
the judge is an arbiter and not an arm of the prosecution."
12. Smith v. United States, 238 F.2d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1956), dis-
cussed in Note, supra note 6, at 705. See also United States v. Durham,
181 F. Supp. 503 (DD.C. 1960), in which Judge Holtzoff stated, "Rules
of evidence are not applicable to the imposition of sentence." See also
Coleman v. United States, 334 F.2d 558 (D.D.C. 1964).
13. Pilot Institute on Sentencing, 26 F.RfD. 380-81 (1959).
14. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07(3) (Proposed Official Draft, 19862).
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Other attempts to create a checklist are substantially similar.
Judge Duffy has suggested a list of criteria which does not in-
clude family situation and background and economic status but
which does include a military history and a statement by the
defendant. 15 Such a statement may prove very helpful. It is
very possible that the defendant, speaking informally to a com-
petent probation officer outside the imposing and confining court-
room situation may be able to project an element of his per-
sonality that would not otherwise be apparent to the judge.'"
The more humanist approach moves away from the con-
cept of a list of criteria and views the report as a case study. The
report should still include factual data on the defendant's family
background, his activities and experiences in youth, his educa-
tion, employment, associations and interests. It should also dis-
cuss more subjective matters including:
causal factors underlying his downfall, opportunities for growth,
and probabilities of his responding to sympathetic and under-
standing treatment, together with a multitude of isolated but
significant episodes of his past life which portray a vivid pic-
ture of his very character and personality. Such a revealing
sketch of an individual, coupled at times with letters of re-
sponsible citizens who have knowledge of a defendant's former
conduct, would certainly seem to lay a foundation upon which
one may exercise a reasonable judgment, fallible though it may
be.17
A somewhat less zealous statement of the same approach has
been made by Louis Sharp, Chief of the Probation Division of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts:
The report should clearly reflect the attitudes and feelings of
the defendant regarding his offense, his family, his employment,
and the community. It should be a living story. As one judge
has so aptly put it, "It should be a story told briefly about a
fellow human being who is in trouble. It should be told in
simple language but in so doing the probation officer should
never lose sight of the fact that he is describing a living person-
ality."1 8
This approach may be visionary but it does seem to represent a
wholesome attitude toward the judicial job of individualization.
While the checklist is more likely to be within the reach of an
understaffed and overburdened probation officer and the "psy-
15. Duffy, The Value of Presentence Investigation Reports to the
Court, 5 FED. PROBATION 3, 4 (July-Sept. 1941).
16. Id.
17. Kennedy, The Pre-sentence Investigation Report is Indispens-
able to the Court, 5 FED. PROBATON 3 (Apr.-June, 1941).
18. Sharp, Presentence Resources, 30 F.R.D. 483, 484 (1961).
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chiatric report" is not likely to be within his professional com-
petence, whatever help the officer can furnish to a sympathetic
judge is likely to facilitate and ameliorate the sentencing func-
tion.
In short, the content of the report should be such as will
allow the sentencing authority to make a decision based on a
knowledge of the defendant's personality, environment and
needs. Even with an excellent report before him, however, a
judge without a flair for people may not make the right choice;
but even a judge with such a flair can make mistakes.
It has just been assumed that, given an investigation report on
the particular offender before him for sentence, the judge will,
by his learning and experience, or by some sort of superjurispru-
dential magic, be able to decide the exact penal or correctional
measure suited to the particular person undergoing sentence and
the length of time the offender needs to be subjected to such
treatment in order to reform or be rendered nondangerous....
To speak glibly about "individualization" is one thing and to be
able to accomplish it is quite another.19
The problem of achieving creative individualization is not as
simple as the problem of achieving adequate presentence re-
ports. And while criteria for the presentence report may be es-
tablished it is no assurance of the ultimate goal.
C. PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATIONS AND UNIFORMITY OF SENTENCING
Uniformity is also an objective of the criminal law; it need
not be in opposition to the objective of individualization. The
presentence investigation and report has potential to help in
the realization of this objective also.
It has been suggested that disparity of sentencing which
has no apparent rational basis is both offensive to principles of
justice and harmful to rehabilitation of the criminal. Success-
ful rehabilitation depends in large part on prisoner morale,
which may be adversely affected if a prisoner believes his sen-
tence to be the result of the sentencing judge's personal preju-
dices. 20 There is some justification for such a belief. The sen-
tence an offender receives seems to depend more on the judge
to whom his case is assigned than on any other factor. This is
true both as to length of sentence and likelihood of probation.2 '
As the system moves from statutory to judicial definition of sezi-
19. Glueck, The Sentencing Problem, 20 FED. PROBATION 15, 16 (Dec.
1956).
20. Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 1453, 1459 (1960).
21. Glueck, supra note 19, at 17.
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tences such disparity becomes increasingly possible. "Discretion
there should certainly be; but the problem is to provide a tech-
nique whereby discretion shall be allowed ample creative scope
and yet be subjected to rational external discipline or self-disci-
pline. ' 22 Adequate presentence reports are essential to such
discipline so long as the objective of the system is to treat similar
individuals similarly.23 Offenders can be treated in a consistent
and uniform manner in a system which emphasizes individuali-
zation only when the sentencing authority has adequate informa-
tion to know what variables of personality are being dealt with.
Without such reports the decision as to sentence can rest only
on hunches and impressions, an unsteady base at best.
It may be useful at this point to examine briefly three possi-
ble modes of reducing sentencing disparity with particular em-
phasis on the role of the presentence investigation.
1. Judicial Review
Judicial review of sentences would tend to eliminate dis-
parity in two ways. First, it would reduce the number of tri-
bunals actually making the sentencing decision, for the number
of appellate courts is considerably smaller than the number of
courts of original jurisdiction. Second, as in any area of the law,
appellate review would over time tend to lead to clear enuncia-
tion of standards which lower courts would follow.2'
There are three major objections to such a system. It flies
in the face of eighty years of precedent which has led almost
every jurisdiction to deny itself such a system. 25 It would add
22. Id. at 19.
23. There is a temptation to assume that uniformity requires that
all people who commit the same act be treated in the same manner;
but, of course, similar treatment of all individuals who have similar
characteristics without regard to the specific criminal act they commit is
also a form of uniform handling.
24. See Note on sentencing disparities in M. PAULSEN & S. KADIS11,
CRIINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 162 (1962).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604-07 (2d
Cir. 1952), in which the court disclaimed power to modify the death sen-
tences imposed by the trial judge on Ethel and Julius Rosenberg:
Unless we are to over-rule sixty years of undeviating federal
precedents, we must hold that an appellate court has no power
to modify a sentence. "If there is one rule in the federal crimi-
nal practice which is firmly established, it is that the appellate
court has no control over a sentence which is within the limits
allowed by a statute." Gurera v. U.S., 40 F.2d 338, 340 (8th Cir.
1930). Id. at 604 .... In England, Canada and in several of
our states, upper courts have held that they may revise sen-
tences while affirming convictions. But these rulings were
based on statutory authority. Commonwealth v. Garramone,
307 Pa. 507, 161 A. 733 (1932). Id. at 605.
[Vol. 55:15
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to the work schedule of appellate courts which are already over-
burdened, and would make speedy justice a more distant reality.
Finally, such a system would produce only surface uniformity
rather than the creative use of discretion because the deciding
court would be twice removed from the offender and would not
have an opportunity to observe him directly and thus come to
understand him.2 6 To the extent that this criticism denies that
an adequate job could be done, it denies the efficacy of presen-
tence reports. It is apparent that the further the deciding tri-
bunal is removed from the defendant, the greater will be its re-
liance on such reports. It is equally apparent, however, that
there would be virtually no possibility of obtaining meaning-
ful uniformity under a system of judicial review without compe-
tent presentence investigation.
2. Prediction Studies
Prediction studies often are advanced as a desirable way
of obtaining uniformity.27 Prediction tables are the product of
empirical studies of the subsequent careers of representative
samples of offenders which relate personal and social charac-
teristics of classes of offenders with their subsequent post-cor-
rectional conduct. Using these tables a judge can "score" a de-
fendant in terms of the existence of success- or failure-predictive
factors and thus indicate the likelihood of his leading a law-abid-
ing life.
It is not uncommon in our society to make judgments
about a man's potential on the basis of probabilities-consider the
Scholastic Aptitude Test or the Law School Aptitude Test. Such
a course is followed with more hesitency, however, when the
probabilities will determine whether an individual is to be
compelled to remain in prison or may be permitted to walk the
streets free.
Another objection to this approach is that, given the present
nature of our society, prediction tables may serve to institu-
tionalize racism. Even if race factors were not considered in
creating tables of this nature, other factors relating to environ-
ment, such as relative poverty might correlate highly not only
with recidivism but also with race. Thus members of a group
which has a high rate of recidivism would be likely candidates
for comparatively harsh treatment at the hands of the courts. A
26. See Glueck, supra note 19, at 19.
27. See M. PAursEN & S. KADisH, supra note 24, at 162.
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self-fulfilling prophecy would thus begin; such harsh treatment
could become a factor in the continued high recidivism rate
within that group. A constant revision of the data would be
necessary and even that might not be enough; the treatment
accorded on the basis of present variables might inhibit change
and thus serve permanently to stigmatize one section of the
population.
At any rate, if a jurisdiction were to make use of these tables
it would require reliance on presentence investigation and re-
ports. The usual variables that are considered in the creation of
such tables are the seriousness and frequency of the offender's
criminality, prior penal experience, economic responsibility and
mental abnormality.28 If a given offender is to be "scored"
against norm groups on these factors, the judge will have to have
reliable information about him that cannot be otherwise ob-
tained. Mere hunches and impressions do not appear on the
table. The presentence report is an essential part of the predic-
tion table method of obtaining uniformity.
3. Indeterminate Sentencing
The Model Penal Code and others have suggested an inde-
terminate sentence plan.29 The Code would consolidate all fel-
onies into three punishment categories 30 and would require that
the sentencing judge impose both the statutory maximum and
the statutory minimum for each category of felony in every
case.3 1 Parole is available after the minimum time has elapsed.
The major shortcoming of such a plan is that it provides
no assurance of uniformity in the decision to give parole. The
problems created by the requirement of uniformity are post-
28. Id. at 166.
29. Id. at 167.
30. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
31. Id. § 6.06:
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced
to imprisonment, as follows:(1) in the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term
the minimum of which shall be fixed by the Court at
not less than one year nor more than ten years, and
the maximum of which shall be life imprisonment;(2) in the case of a felony of the second degree for a term
the minimum of which shall be fixed by the Court at
not less than one year nor more than three years, and
the maximum of which shall be ten years;
(3) in the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term
the minimum of which shall be fixed by the Court at
not less than one year nor more than two years, and
the maximum of which shall be five years.
[Vol. 55:15
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poned, not resolved, by the plan. Under such a plan, however, a
single board or group of boards working together in close co-
operation might be used to determine the length of incarceration
to which every prisoner would be subjected. Uniformity would
be assured by the fact that all cases would proceed through the
same channel. 32
In a system where the judge must impose a statutory mini-
mum and maximum the need for a presentence report is negligi-
ble. However, this does not mean that there is no need for in-
vestigation and report. The plan merely shifts the time and place
of discretion from the court before sentencing to the parole board
some time later. Professor Wechsler has argued that this delay
is one of the most valuable attributes of such a system. 'Even
when aided by a competent presentence study and report, the
court is poorly equipped at the time of sentence to make solid and
decisive judgments on the period required for the process of
correction to realize its optimum potentiality or for the risk of
further criminality to reach a level where release of the offender
appears reasonably safe."33 Arguably this can best be done after
time has elapsed allowing for more detailed examination of the
individual offender. The indeterminate sentence plan allows
more time for a report to be prepared and gives prison social
workers and psychiatrists an opportunity to observe each of-
fender. The system strives to maintain individualization; and,
to the extent that it does, it must rely on such techniques.
In short, it has been demonstrated that the objectives of in-
dividualization and of uniformity need not be at odds with one
another. Judicial review, prediction studies and indeterminate
sentence plans represent three possible approaches which allow
for the uniform treatment of similar individuals. Further, it
has been shown that presentence reports or something essentially
similar in nature will have an important role in a system which
successfully administers criminal rehabilitation.
When once we realize that punishment qua punishment does not
bring about the desired result of protection of society, and that
constructive individualized treatment of offenders against the
law is more likely to achieve it, we are met with the basic
problems in administrative law-the need and the methods of
safeguarding individual rights against the possible arbitrary ac-
tion of a technically skilled, yet "all too human," administra-
tive board.34
32. Holtzoff, The Indeterminate Sentence Plan: Its Social and Le-
gal Implications, 5 FED. PROBATION 3, 5 (June-Mar. 1941).
33. Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 465, 476 (1961).
34- Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARv. L. REV.
453, 478 (1928).
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III. DISCLOSURE OF PRESENTENCE REPORTS
The results of a presentence investigation may be damaging
to a defendant; yet a right to see and contest such reports is not
yet established. Most statutes are silent on the issue of dis-
closure and the silence has been construed as affording trial
courts discretion as to whether the contents of a report should be
disclosed.3 5  There is evidence that trial judges, in exercising
this discretion, generally deny disclosure 6 Some courts have
followed a middle road, endorsed by the Model Penal Code, dis-
closing the contents of a report but not its sources.3 7
Even where disclosure is allowed, it does not necessarily fol-
low that an opportunity will be provided for the defendant to
refute adverse material contained in a report. Statutes are si-
lent on this issue in most jurisdictions and the courts have gen-
erally restricted a defendant's opportunity to refute.38  These
matters are apparently within the discretion of the trial court.
There is usually no right to cross-examine a probation officer39
and, of course, there can be no such right as to the investi-
gator's informants. 40 Generally cross-examination is denied on
the theory that it would excessively burden an already over-
worked staff of probation departments. 4 1  Professor Gellhorn
35. United States v. Schwenke, 221 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1955); State
v. Moore, 49 Del. 29, 108 A.2d 675 (1954).
36. Sharp, supra note 5, at 246 (citing a 1958 study which revealed
that in 65 of 96 probation units the report was available only to the
sentencing judge and that in only 11 units was the report generally
available to defense counsel). See also Higgens, Confidentiality of Pre-
sentence Reports, 28 ALBANY L. REV. 12 (1964); Lorenson, The Disclosurc
to Defense of Presentence Reports in West Virginia, 69 W. VA. L. REv.
159 (1967); Note, supra note 6, at 706.
37. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07(5) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962);
Zeff v. Sanford, 31 F. Supp. 736, 738 (N.D. Ga. 1940).
38. Note, supra note 6, at 709. But see the language of the
amendment to FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c) (2) which became effective July
1, 1966.
The court before imposing sentence may disclose to the defend-
ant or his counsel all or part of the material contained in the
report of the presentence investigation and afford an oppor-
tunity to the defendant or his counsel to comment thereon.
Any material disclosed to the defendant or his counsel shall also
be available to the attorney for the government (emphasis
added).
The language seems to state that the court may disclose the contents
of the report to the defendant and may allow defendant an oppor-
tunity to refute.
39. People v. Giles, 70 Cal. App.2d 872, 161 P.2d 623 (1945). How-
ever, in Virginia cross-examination of the officer is allowed by statute.
VA. CODE ANN. § 53-278.1 (1967).
40. Note, supra note 6, at 710.
41. Id.
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has suggested that the possibility of cross-examination would
tend to make an investigator unduly cautious, causing the re-
moval of important data from the report in an effort to avoid the
presentation of controversial issues that might lead to an un-
pleasant cross-examination. 42
At present, then, neither disclosure nor an opportunity to re-
fute damaging information in a report is generally considered a
right of a defendant. It is arguable, however, that the United
States Constitution requires the establishment of such a right;
and that even if it does not, that the establishment of such a
right would be in the public interest.
The issue of whether due process compels disclosure and an
opportunity to refute has never been squarely faced. The issue
was not presented in Williams v. New York. 43 That case upheld
the constitutionality of section 482 of the New York Criminal
Code which permitted the use of presentence reports which
include information that would not have been admissible at
trial. The opinion itselfW4 stresses that the report was not chal-
lenged by the defendant; thus it is not clear whether the de-
fendant has a right to challenge under Williams. The case stands
only for the admissibility of such reports and for the principle
that they need not adhere to the constraints of the usual rules of
evidence. Yet some maintain that Williams held more. Thus,
for example, Judge Keating has said:
Strictly speaking, the Supreme Court held only that the use of
hearsay probation reports for purposes of aiding the discretion of
the sentencing court did not constitute a denial of due process.
Implicit in the Court's ruling, however, is the unmistakable rec-
ognition of a practice which denies a defendant the right to con-
front and cross-examine those who supply the critical informa-
tion upon which the report is based.4 5
Two state courts have held that disclosure is not a constitu-
tional requirement under due process. 40 Contra, however, is
42. W. GELLHORN, Cm.uPA n .& FAMLnES fn TaECounTs oF Nnw
YoRK 332 (1954).
43. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). The narrow holding of the case is that the
14th Amendment does not restrict the trial judge when determining
sentence to the same type of evidence used to determine guilt. Id.
at 250.
44. Id. at 244.
45. People v. Peace, 18 N.Y.2d 230, 233, 219 N.E.2d 419, 420, 273
N.Y.S.2d 64, 66 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967).
46. State v. Moore, 49 Del. 29, 108 A.2d 675 (1954); State v.
Benes, 16 N.J. 389, 108 A.2d 846 (1954). In addition, People v. Peace,
18 N.Y.2d 230, 219 N.E.2d 419, 273 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1032 (1967) argues for the same position and accepts it as operative
without actually referring to constitutional language.
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Townsend v. Burke,47 which seems to stand for the principle
that disclosure is a federal constitutional requirement. The judge
in the lower court relied heavily on material allegations of de-
fendant's past which were untrue. The Supreme Court indicated
that the unrepresented defendant had been denied due process
because without counsel he was unable to go about trying to cor-
rect the misconceptions of the report. The due process violation
was in the denial of counsel; however, disclosure is implicit in
the Court's reasoning, since the assumption that counsel could
operate effectively was rooted in the assumption that he would
have had access to the material. This case seems to establish a
right to have access to the presentence reports and to refute the
material contained therein. However, the passage of twenty
years has not seen the actual creation of such a system of consti-
tutional rights. Whatever Townsend v. Burke seems to stand
for, its history indicates that it is not a landmark case in Ameri-
can jurisprudence. 48 A Third Circuit case decided in 1953' 9 holds
that an enhanced sentence cannot be made unless the defendant
is protected by a due process right to contest the basic factual
allegations on which the increased sentence is predicated. This
case, however, stands with Townsend v. Burke as something
other than a significant landmark in American law.
A 1966 case, Kent v. United States,5 0 is arguably the decision
in which a constitutional requirement of disclosure can be found.
Petitioner was arrested at age 16 in connection with charges of
housebreaking, robbery and rape. He was subject to the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the District of Columbia juvenile court, un-
less that court after "full investigation" decided to waive juris-
diction and remit him for trial to the U.S. District Court.5'
After the investigation a waiver of jurisdiction was made. The
defendant was never given a hearing of any sort. The Supreme
Court held the waiver invalid. Terming the waiver decision
47. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
48. See, e.g., Hoover v. United States, 268 F.2d 787 (10th Cir.
1959), in which the statement is made that not affording a defendant an
opportunity to rebut statements contained in a presentence report does
not violate due process.
49. United States ex rel. Collins v. Claudy, 204 F.2d 624 (3d Cir.
1953).
50. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
51. Of course, issues relating to jurisdiction are statutory; thus the
requirement of "full investigation" is a statutory requirement. This is
important because some commentators maintain that Kent involves
statutory interpretation rather than constitutional law in which case its
implications are severely limited.
[Vol. 55:15
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critically important, the Court held that a hearing was required
and that petitioner's counsel was entitled to the probation rec-
ords and similar reports. The discretion of the lower court was
abused by virtue of a failure to act with "procedural regularity
sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process and fairness."5 2 The Court stated
that the investigation and decision without a hearing constituted
a denial of effective assistance of counsel on a matter of tre-
mendous consequence and that "it is inconceivable that a court
of justice dealing with adults, with respect to a similar issue,
would proceed in this manner." 53 In the circumstances of this
case, where the decision made could affect whether the sentence
was five years' imprisonment or death, the Court concluded that,
"as a condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner was entitled
to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social rec-
ords and probation or similar reports .... [T]his result is re-
quired by the statute read in the context of constitutional prin-
ciples relating to due process and the assistance of counsel.15 4
A look beyond the particulars of the immediate case sug-
gests that the due process and right to counsel provisions of the
Constitution require that reports which will be used in reaching
a decision of great consequence to an offender must be subject
to attack by counsel. The sentencing decision is of immense con-
sequence to his future. Consequently, presentence reports must
be subject to attack. Kent v. United States would seem to be the
constitutional authority needed to introduce this much needed
safeguard into the law.
However, it is not clear that Kent represents constitutional
authority at all. In a subsequent case, making reference to the
Kent decision, Mr. Justice Harlan maintained that the case did
not purport to rest on constitutional grounds but depended solely
on the interpretation of the statute vesting jurisdiction in the
juvenile court.55 That same position was taken by Judge Keat-
ing of the New York Court of Appeals.5" In essence the argu-
ment is that disclosure of the records is necessitated by the
language of the District of Columbia statute which requires that
"[t] he records or parts thereof ... shall be made available by
52. 383 U.S. at 553.
53. Id. at 554.
54. Id. at 557.
55. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 66 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring &
dissenting).
56. People v. Peace, 18 N.Y.2d 230, 219 N.E.2d 419, 273 N.Y.S.2d 64
(1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967).
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rule or special order of court to such persons ... as have a legiti-
mate interest in the protection. . . of the child."57
But such a position seems to deny a great deal else that is in
the language of Kent. In the very paragraph in which the
statute is cited the court stated, "With respect to access by the
child's counsel to the social records of the child, we deem it ob-
vious that since these are to be considered by the Juvenile Court
in making its decision to waive, they must be made available to
the child's counsel. s58 This would seem to be the case without
regard to the statute, as a consequence of the right to effective
assistance of counsel. The statutory language is then intro-
duced by the Court, but it would seem to be not decisive but
merely supportive. In fact earlier in the opinion the Court
concludes that:
as a condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner was entitled
to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social rec-
ords and probation or similar reports which presumably are
considered by the court, and to a statement of reasons for the
Juvenile Court's decision. We believe that this result is required
by the statute read in the context of constitutional principles
relating to due process and the assistance of counsel.59
It must be pointed out that the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari in the case of People v. Peace,r," the case in which Judge
Keating took the position that Kent involved statutory interpreta-
tion rather than constitutional principles. Although a denial of
certiorari cannot be taken to indicate acceptance of all the dicta
in an opinion of a lower court, it is an indication that the Court
was not prepared at that time boldly to state a seemingly logical
extension of Kent.
There is an additional and perhaps more persuasive argu-
ment that the Kent holding does not necessarily constitute con-
stitutional authority for the disclosure of presentence reports.
That argument is rooted in the language and history of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure. Despite a recommendation to
the contrary by the Advisory Committee it had appointed, the
Supreme Court in 1944 adopted rules which did not require that
presentence reports be disclosed to the defense. 1 In subse-
57. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 11-1586(b) (1966).
58. 383 U.S. at 562.
59. Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
60. 18 N.Y.2d 230, 219 N.E.2d 419, 273 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967).
61. For a discussion of this history see State v. Moore, 49 Del. 29,
103 A.2d 67 (1954). See also L. OIFIELD, 5 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES 166 (1967).
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quent years the issue of disclosure continued to be hotly de-
bated. Other advisory committees were commissioned to make
recommendations to the Court, and on July 1, 1966, an amend-
ment to Rule 32 (c) (2) became effective. The Rule now provides:
"The court before imposing sentence may disclose to the de-
fendant or his counsel all or part of the material contained in the
report of the presentence investigation and afford an opportunity
to the defendant or his counsel to comment thereon."0 2 The
amendment is in no way innovative; it is a restatement of exist-
ing procedure.
If Kent represents constitutional authority on the issue of
disclosure, Rule 32(c) (2) is in violation of constitutional princi-
ples.63 But the Rule, promulgated by the very same Supreme
Court that decided Kent, became effective more than three
months after that decision. 4 One is hard put to explain how it
came to be that the Court promulgated a rule violative of con-
stitutional principles it had just recently established. It is plausi-
ble to maintain that the adoption of the Rule makes clear that
Kent stands for less than the proponents of disclosure maintain.
There is, however, one other possible explanation-that the pro-
cess of promulgation of the Rule began and, in fact, was com-
pleted prior to the March 21 decision. In the short period of
time remaining before the Rule became effective, the Court may
not have had time to make changes in the Rule. Indeed, in so
short a period of time the Court may not have had time to con-
sider all the implications of Kent. It is not reasonable to expect
that all the problems raised by the creation of a new constitutional
right will be so immediately obvious to the Court, especially
when it is operating in a legislative (rule-making) capacity with-
out the benefit of counsel and adversarial procedure. In short,
though the Rule became effective after Kent was decided, it is
possible that the implications of Kent were not thoughtfully con-
sidered and incorporated into the Rule. Thus, it is not at all im-
plausible to maintain that, as between the case law and the rule
of procedure, the rule must fail in the case of discrepancy de-
spite the fact that it carries the more recent date. The author
62. L. OnFInUr, supra note 61, at 226.
63. People v. Peace, 18 N.Y.2d 230, 219 N.E.2d 419, 273 N.Y.S.2d 64
(1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967).
64. Kent was decided on March 21, 1966.
65. The statement of the Advisory Committee to the Supreme
Court on the amendment to Rule 32(c) (2) made no mention of Kent;
indeed no material cited in the statement is dated later than 1964.
L. ORnm~, supra note 61, at 167 et seq. The amendment was adopted by
the Court on Feb. 28, 1966-before Kent. 383 U.S. 1087 (1966).
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believes that, considered in the light of the Kent case, the rule of
procedure requires a new amendment.
In any event it seems that this is the direction in which the
law ought to move. Proponents of a different view maintain
that disclosure will tend to dry up the sources available to pro-
bation officers. In addition to information obtained from the de-
fendant himself through interviews, the officer makes use of
more traditional ways of obtaining information. He investigates
documents such as police records and health reports and he
interviews relatives, acquaintances and employers of the de-
fendant and members of the social work community with whom
he may have had contact.6 6 It is feared that such persons will
be reluctant to talk openly and honestly if they cannot be as-
sured confidentiality. However, we require that people who
come to court to testify on the issue of guilt be available for con-
frontation. There is no guarantee of confidentiality for testi-
mony, but the system works. It is not altogether clear that the
same procedure used to determine the crucial issue of guilt will
prove dysfunctional in the determination of appropriate sentence.
In fact, judges whose usual practice includes the disclosure of
such reports indicate that the accessibility of such reports to the
defense does not seem to have the inhibiting effect on inform-
ants that is feared by those who resist disclosure.Y1
It is also argued that disclosure will cause delay by protract-
ing the sentencing process while the defendant controverts data
which appears in the report. In practice, however, this seems
not to be the case. Several judges, in fact, have reported the
opposite experience-that disclosure permits the scope of argu-
ment regarding sentence to be limited and permits the discussion
to be directed to pertinent considerations.6 8 Beyond that, it
seems plausible, if not probable, that interested cross-examination
(as by a defendant rather than a disinterested probation officer,
who is probably inadequately trained in any event) is necessary
to assure the truth of the allegations in the report on which a
judge may rely very heavily; 69 this alone would justify any
delay.
Furthermore, disclosure may well be the best possible case-
66. Barnett & Gronewald, Confidentiality of the Presentence Re-
port, 26 FED. PROBATION 26 (Mar. 1962).
67. Higgens, supra note 36, at 32.
68. Id.
69. Note, Due Process and Legislative Standards in Sentencing,
101 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 276-77 (1952).
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work practice in a system which aims towards rehabilitation.
Such disclosure is "an opportunity to interpret the report, so
that the disposition will be better understood and a mutually
open relationship begun." 70 Disclosure is an act of fairness and
honesty and as such it is a positive, constructive element in the
success of the entire probation process.71
Regardless of any possible constitutional stricture, an en-
lightened judiciary would do well to follow such a policy. Judge
Wyzanski has written that "[d] espite the latitude [so far] per-
mitted by the Due Process Clause, it seems to me that a judge in
considering his sentence, just as in trying a defendant, should
never take into account any evidence, report or other fact which
is not brought to the attention of defendant's counsel with op-
portunity to rebut it."72
IV. CONCLUSION
As the system of criminal administration strives to treat
similar offenders in a consistent and uniform manner, the use of
presentence investigations and reports is likely to constantly
increase. Such a procedure represents a threat to the protection
of individual rights. However, disclosure of the contents of such
reports and provision for an opportunity to rebut the material
therein are likely to constitute effective safeguards. The con-
stitutional groundwork for finding such a procedure indispensa-
ble may already exist. It is at least plausible to expect that
disclosure increasingly will become the rule of procedure in
American courts.
70. Rubin, What Privacy for Presentence Reports, 16 FED. PnoATioN
8, 9 (Dec. 1952).
71. Id.
72. Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65
HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1291 (1952).
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